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ABSTRACT 
 
Many expect legally-recognized same-sex marriage (SSM) to have significant effects on 
people’s behavior. This stance regarding SSM’s effects reflects a persistent, wide-spread belief 
that the law has a significant and reliable effect on social norms. However, I will argue that 
belief in the law’s capacity to effectively change social norms does not adequately take account 
of the nature of social norms, how they actually change, and the limits of government 
intervention. Through examining SSM and these factors more closely, I cast doubt on the claim 
that the law significantly, reliably, and effectively challenges mainstream, marital social norms. 
Instead, SSM is better seen as an indicator of gradual changes in conceptions of marriage. When 
explaining changes in marital social norms, we should not waste our time on SSM, rather we 
should look to non-state factors.  
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Many on the political right view legal recognition of same-sex marriage (SSM)1 as a 
significant challenge to heteronormativity—the privileging and normalization of heterosexuality, 
sexual conservatism, procreation, traditional gender roles, and relationships that are 
monogamous, long-term, romantically-oriented, and (nuclear-)family-oriented.2 They worry that 
SSM “weaken[s] the social institution of marriage” by de-emphasizing traditional marital norms 
requiring heterosexuality, traditional gender roles, procreation, etc. (Girgis, George, & Anderson 
2011, 260).3 Some on the political left also see SSM as challenging heteronormativity, albeit in a 
positive manner.4 For example, some on the moderate left support SSM as a way to “de-center” 
and “jeopardize” the status of heteronormativity (Meeks & Stein 2006, 154).5 More generally, 
58-61% of Americans think that SSM will change society for better or worse, according to 
national polls conducted by Gallup (Jones 2009).6 Insofar as these groups causally connect SSM 
                                                 
1 ‘SSM’ will refer specifically to legal recognition of same-sex marriage unless otherwise noted. 
2
 This definition of heteronormativity is stipulative and will be expounded in section two.  
3 For examples of these concerns in the popular press, see Benne & McDermott 2004, Jackson Jr. 2010, Anderson 
2013, and Morabito 2015.  
4 For an overview of the ways in which those on the political right and left expect SSM to change social behavior, 
see Badgett 2009, Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
5
 There are a number of examples of this reasoning in the popular press. Various media outlets have incorrectly 
linked legal recognition of gay marriage with fewer LGBTQ+ teen suicides—supposedly due to a weakening of 
heteronormative norms (Shapiro 2017). Robinson, Bailey, and McGorry (2017) tenuously make causal connections 
between SSM, weakened heteronormativity, lower suicide rates, and improvement in a variety of other health 
outcomes. Kevin Joffré (2015) argues that gay marriage is disruptive to heteronormative marital norms.  
 Those on the radical left also believe that SSM affects heteronormativity, although they view SSM as 
strengthening heteronormativity and creating a more conservative culture at large (See the first section of Conrad 
2012). Because the radical left has a different take on SSM’s effects than does the political right or moderate left, 
they would require a different reply and so I do not address the radical leftists’ view in this paper. Nevertheless, they 
could still glean important insights from this thesis. 
6 Polls were conducted on two separate occasions in 2003 and 2009. In 2003, 48% thought SSM would have a 
positive effect on society, 10% a positive effect, 40% no effect, and 2% expressed no opinion. In 2009, 48% again 
thought SSM would have a positive effect on society, 13% a positive effect, 36% no effect, and 2% again expressed 
no opinion (Jones 2009). Unfortunately, I was not able to find more recent or more specific polls on American’s 
perception of the perceived effects of SSM on society. 
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to the disruption of heteronormative marital norms, they drastically overstate the effects of the 
law on social norms.7 This stance on SSM’s effects reflects a persistent, wide-spread belief that 
the law has a significant and reliable effect on social norms—often found under the headings of 
the social engineering view or the economic analysis of law (Moore 1973, 719; Licht 2008; and 
Bicchieri & Mercier 2014, 64).8 Indeed, some even argue that state bans are necessary in order to 
eliminate harmful practices—like breast implants and female genital cutting—that are dependent 
on social norms (C. Chambers 2008, 194-197).9 However, as I will argue, belief in the law’s 
capacity to effectively change social norms does not adequately take account of the nature of 
social norms, how they actually change, and the limits of government intervention. 
Section two will provide necessary explication of heteronormativity. It is not sufficient to 
quickly define the term here for two reasons. First, heteronormativity is a fairly new, esoteric 
term primarily used by feminists and queer theorists. Second, “heteronormativity” is not meant 
to be understood as its roots (“hetero” and “norm”) would be literally understood. Rather it has 
developed as a shorthand to describe the privileging and normalization of certain types of 
sexuality, gender, and relationships that are valued by mainstream, heterosexual, Western 
culture. Thus it is necessary to review the development of heteronormativity in order to explain 
its meaning and application. With this development in mind, I will settle on a stipulative 
definition that takes account of the most fundamental features of heteronormativity. 
                                                 
7 This paper is primarily concerned with social norms. All references to “norms” should be read as reference to 
social norms, unless otherwise specified. 
8 For an example of this view in international diplomacy, see Hillary Clinton’s 2011 speech to the U.N. where she 
claims that “progress comes from change in laws” and that “laws have a teaching effect” (full transcript available 
from Volsky & Ford 2011). She notes later on that important change can from below—e.g. from neighbors and 
communities deciding to treat each other more fairly—but these comments are still consistent with her strong belief 
in the ability of laws to effectively change people’s behavior. 
9 “The only way for most individuals to escape a social norm that is a requirement for achieving social status (such 
as marriage) is in a context of (near-) universal noncompliance so that the norm ceases to function” (C. Chambers 
2008, 194). 
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After establishing the concept of heteronormativity in section two, section three will 
show that SSM does not meet the conditions necessary for significantly challenging social 
norms. There is nothing exceptionally different between “traditional” marriage and SSM 
(Wedgwood 1999)—certainly nothing that is going to change the norms of those who do not 
value the practices or views of homosexuals in the first place. The ineluctable differences—
homosexuality and non-traditional gender roles—are downplayed in attempts to assimilate into 
mainstream culture. Additionally, these differences are only small parts of a resilient schema of 
beliefs and values concerning marriage. Small changes guarantee no significant challenge to the 
schema. 
In section four, I argue that the majoritarian, republican structure of the U.S. government 
severely limits the ability of the law to significantly and effectively challenge mainstream, 
dominant social norms such as heteronormative marital norms. Indeed, often the government 
must appeal to mainstream norms in order for law to be passed, adopted, and enforced. These 
mainstream norms are largely formed by non-state factors, like increases in material wealth and 
cultural revolutions. Examining these factors reveals that heteronormativity and marriage have 
gradually weakened as institutions over the last 200 years. Through this historical lens, SSM 
appears to be more of an evolution than a revolution in the institution of marriage (Coontz 2011). 
While the state may try to subvert these historical trends, radical legislation and court decisions 
inconsistent with mainstream social norms rarely pass. And even when they do, such policy 
encounters issues with implementation, enforcement, and long-term viability. 
 Through examining SSM more closely, we will cast doubt on the claim that the law 
significantly, reliably, and effectively challenges heteronormative marital norms. Due to the 
nature of norm change, limits of government intervention, and the type of factors that drive 
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marital norm change, SSM is better seen as an indicator of gradual changes in conceptions of 
marriage. SSM is not a primary site of norm change. Insofar as the right and left care about 
shoring up or tearing down heteronormativity, they have wasted their time on SSM. If one really 
cares about affecting heteronormativity, marital norms, or other mainstream norms, then one 
needs to consider non-state factors—such as culture, the economy, businesses, and religion—for 
these are the more significant drivers of norm change. These implications will be touched on 
briefly in the conclusion, but before going any further, we need to first clarify the concept of 
heteronormativity. 
 
2 THE CONCEPT OF HETERONORMATIVITY  
While heteronormativity is a common concept among queer theorists and feminists, its 
complicated meaning and absence from common discourse means that we need to carefully 
explicate the concept before we can utilize it in the body of the argument in section three and 
four. We will first address the meaning of heteronormativity as developed by various queer 
theorists and feminist theorists. From this examination we will distill a definition of 
heteronormativity that takes account of the fundamental features relevant to SSM. After we have 
our working definition, I will use a variety of examples to clarify the usage of heteronormativity 
in this paper. 
As we will see below, heteronormativity is a bit of a misnomer. Heteronormativity is not 
primarily about heterosexuality per se; “heteronormativity” is not meant to be understood as its 
roots (“hetero” and “norm”) would be literally understood. Instead, heteronormativity has 
developed as a shorthand to describe the privileging and normalization of certain types of 
sexuality, gender, and relationships that are valued by mainstream, heterosexual, Western 
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culture.10 In other words, heteronormativity is a system of societal norms concerning sexuality, 
gender, and relationships (Herz & Johansson 2015, 1017). But what does mainstream, 
heterosexual, Western culture value? And why does heteronormativity concern anything more 
than heterosexuality in the first place? I will address these questions by examining several 
seminal pieces that have influenced the development of the meaning of the term 
“heteronormativity.” 
Some of the strongest roots of heteronormativity can be found in the work of Gayle 
Rubin and Adrienne Rich. Rubin’s “Thinking Sex” (1984), for example, explores how Western 
society orders various aspects of sexuality on a hierarchy (281-282). Society contrasts good 
sexual practice—that which is “normal, natural, healthy, holy”—with bad sexual practice—that 
which is “abnormal, unnatural, sick, sinful” (ibid, 282). Unsurprisingly, Rubin finds that 
heterosexuality, procreation, monogamy, family, and long-term, romantic relationships are the 
structures of sexuality that society deems good and normal (ibid).11 These are the aspects that 
society privileges and normalizes. Similarly, Adrienne Rich’s (1980) work explicates the effects 
of “compulsory” or “prescriptive” heterosexuality on the norms governing sexuality, gender 
roles, and family structure. Compulsory heterosexuality works through a “cluster of forces” to 
                                                 
10
 Several prominent queer theorists and feminists note this use of heteronormativity. For example, Stevi Jackson 
(2006) provides a similar interpretation: “the concept [of heteronormativity] has become widely used as shorthand 
for the numerous ways in which heterosexual privilege is woven into the fabric of social life, pervasively and 
insidiously ordering everyday existence” (108). In 2009, Jane Ward and Beth Schneider introduced a special issue of 
the prominent journal Gender & Society—designed to address how “heteronormativity underpins all social 
phenomena, including the construction of identities, the dynamics of relationships, the discourses and symbols of 
culture, and the practices of institutions” (438). Finally, in seeking to clarify the conceptual boundaries of 
heteronormativity, Marcus Herz and Thomas Johansson (2015) note the common usage of heteronormativity “as a 
critique not only of gender divisions and hierarchies but also of more specific ways of organizing family, sexuality, 
and lifestyle” (1011).  
11 By using “structure of sexuality” instead of just sexuality, Rubin signals that she is concerned not only with the 
simple physical act of sex, but also with how sex is practiced and expressed in various different “structures.” So 
while family and monogamy do not seem to have anything to do with sex, they function as normal, privileged ways 
for sexuality to be expressed. 
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make it “inevitable” and “normal” for there to be distinct gender roles, wherein men are 
dominant; for everyone to be heterosexual and sexually conservative; and for everyone to be 
married, monogamous, reproducing, and raising a family (ibid, 640-641).12 Behavior that 
deviates from these acceptable, valued practices is frequently called “queer,” “sick,” or 
“unnatural” (ibid, 641). Although Rubin and A. Rich use different descriptions and terms, both 
describe a system of privilege and normalization based on “the power of heterosexuality as a 
norm” (S. Chambers 2007, 657). 
In 1991, Michael Warner coins the term “heteronormativity” to describe this system of 
privilege and normalization. While he does not directly or systematically define 
heteronormativity, he does give it meaning through use: he describes modern society as 
heteronormative (1991, 16), aligns heteronormativity with heterosexism13 and heterosexual 
ideology14 (ibid, 6, 9), and contrasts heteronormativity with queer identity—i.e. an identity that 
rejects mainstream, societal norms governing gender, sexuality, and relationships (ibid, 8, 16).  
More recent treatments of heteronormativity have more thoroughly clarified the concept 
and explored its societal implications. For example, John Elia (2003) notes that in the Western 
world, “a certain type of heterosexual relationship style is often promoted as the best, most 
respectable, and cherished” (ibid, 62). Furthermore, Elia conceptualizes heteronormativity as a 
matter of degree, such that even homosexual identity does not preclude one from being 
heteronormative. Indeed, some LGBTQ+ identities “are quite conservative about their sexual 
                                                 
12 Sexual conservatism describes the value for sex that is private, “vanilla,” and traditional—in contrast to sex that is 
public, “kinky,” and liberal. 
13 Heterosexism describes “discrimination or prejudice against homosexuals on the assumption that heterosexuality 
is the normal sexual orientation” (Stevenson & Lindberg 2013). 
14 Heterosexual ideology is the system of beliefs and values that stem from the presumption that heterosexuality is 
the only natural and normal sexual orientation. This term was frequently used by A. Rich (1980) and other feminists 
before heteronormativity came into widespread usage. 
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relationships and ultimately mimic the prescriptively dominant heterosexual norms” (ibid, 77).15 
On Elia’s reading, then, it seems that heteronormativity is more about a general adherence to 
mainstream, Western, heterosexual values rather than just being heterosexual or embodying a 
specific, valuable practice. 
Stevi Jackson (2006) corroborates this argument that heteronormativity is not, and cannot 
be, only about heterosexuality per se, by focusing on the hierarchy of value just among 
heterosexuals: 
Heterosexuality…is not a singular, monolithic entity – it exists in many variants. As 
Seidman points out[,] there are hierarchies of respectability and good citizenship among 
heterosexuals, and what tends to be valorized as ‘norm[al]’ is a very particular form 
founded on traditional gender arrangements and lifelong monogamy (ibid, 105; Jackson 
here references Seidman 2005, 59–60; and Seidman 2002).16 
 
In assessing the development of heteronormativity, Marcus Herz and Thomas Johansson (2015) 
similarly find that “heteronormativity not only aims at changing conditions for homosexuals but 
also targets the whole societal and cultural institution of heterosexuality…including marriage, 
nuclear families, and heterosexual lifestyles” (1011). Thus, heteronormativity is not about a 
simple division between the heterosexuals and homosexuals. Rather, heteronormativity is about 
the specific ways that heterosexuality is practiced. These practices inevitably concern gender 
roles and relationship structure (Jackson 2006, 114-117). We can see this connection without 
even moving away from heterosexuality, as this identity necessarily depends on the ubiquity of 
the gender binary. Without the gender binary, it would not be clear what attraction to the 
                                                 
15
 See also Seidman (2002, 160) for an examination of heteronormative gay representation in the media. 
16
 The quote originally said ‘normative’ instead of ‘normal.’ However, Jackson’s usage diverges from the standard 
philosophical meaning of normativity that I use throughout this thesis. Whereas feminist scholars, like Jackson, most 
often use normative to mean “normal” or “accepted by mainstream culture,” philosophers use normative to refer to 
statements that make claims about what ought or ought not be. 
 
 8 
“opposite” gender could mean.17 Moreover, heterosexual identity is proven through 
relationships, especially marriage. At a certain age, if one has not had tangible signs of romantic 
or sexual relations with the opposite sex, one’s sexuality is often questioned or de-legitimized. If 
one never engages in long-term, romantic relationships and pursues sex in the wrong setting (e.g. 
outside of marriage or with a sex worker), one is often negatively sanctioned. It is not enough to 
simply be attracted to the opposite gender, one must also express that attraction correctly through 
relationships. In sum, the practice of heterosexuality does not occur in a vacuum. Gender roles, 
sexual practice, and relationships are integral to the proper, normal practice of heterosexuality 
and therefore must be included in the concept of heteronormativity. 
With a general overview of the literature on heteronormativity, we can see how 
heteronormativity does not only concern heterosexuality per se, but the expression of 
heterosexuality through appropriate gender roles, sexual activity, and relationship structure. We 
also now have various accounts of the types of sexuality, gender, and relationships that 
mainstream culture values. Compiling the most common, fundamental features together, we can 
stipulate that heteronormativity is the privileging and normalization of heterosexuality, sexual 
conservatism, procreation, traditional gender roles, and relationships that are monogamous, 
long-term, romantically-oriented, and (nuclear-)family-oriented. While feminists and queer 
theorists were the first to give name to this privileging and normalization, it should be 
uncontroversial that society generally privileges these things. One can easily see such evaluation 
in public discourse, education, the media, the law, religion, and various other social institutions 
(Kitzinger 2005, 478). Even with the gradually increasing visibility of homosexuals in the public 
                                                 
17
 Appeals to the sex binary—male and female—will not make the issue any clearer. Without even addressing any 
controversial theories concerning gender or sex, one can see that intersex identities complicate the notion of 
“opposite” sexes or genders (see Fausto-Sterling 1993). More controversial, but equally significant, are the 
arguments that sex itself is a constructed, gendered category (Butler 1990).  
 9 
sphere, strong normative views concerning acceptable expressions of gender, sexuality, and 
relationships persist. 
With a working definition of heteronormativity, we can now clarify how it will be used 
throughout this paper. First, echoing Elia (2003) above, we can note that none of these aspects—
heterosexuality, sexual conservatism, etc.—are independently necessary or sufficient for being 
heteronormative. These conditions work jointly: the more aspects that are present, the stronger 
the heteronormativity. Additionally, some of these aspects are a matter of degree—e.g. one can 
be more or less sexually conservative or traditionally gendered. Since heteronormativity has 
various different aspects, some of which are a matter of degree, heteronormativity is a scalar 
term. One is more or less heteronormative depending on how strongly one adheres to 
heterosexuality, monogamy, traditional gender roles, and other aspects of heteronormativity. As 
for whether someone/something is heteronormative at all, we can reasonably stipulate that if 
most aspects are present or supported, then someone/something is heteronormative. If most 
aspects are absent, then we will say someone/something is not heteronormative, or non-
heteronormative.18 Importantly then, even a homosexual man could be very heteronormative 
(e.g. if he is sexually conservative, part of a two-parent household with kids, committed to life-
long monogamy, traditionally masculine, etc.) and a heterosexual woman could be very non-
heteronormative (e.g. if she practices BDSM, is polyamorous, has lots of short-term 
relationships, never marries, forgoes children, acts “butch,” has sex with other women,19 etc.).  
                                                 
18
 ‘Non-heteronormative’ does not mean, however, that the behavior is without normative implications. Indeed, non-
heteronormative behavior can still be assessed normatively. For instance, one might say that certain non-
heteronormative behavior like polygamy should or should not be performed on moral or religious grounds. 
19
 See J. Ward 2015 for a book-length treatment of the surprisingly common practice of straight people partaking in 
sexual activity with their own gender. 
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Second, heteronormativity is a normative view about which expressions are right and 
which are wrong, not an empirical view about how people actually express gender roles, 
sexuality, and relationships. More specifically, heteronormativity is not about a mere statistical 
norm. It is not about the number of people practicing certain expressions, but rather what 
expressions most people accept. It is about what people value. For example, single motherhood 
could be the statistical norm within society, but that does not mean single motherhood would 
necessarily be heteronormative. If society devalues the worth of a single mother relative to, say, 
a two-parent family, then single motherhood would be non-heteronormative—regardless of the 
number of single mothers. Put differently, unless single motherhood is privileged, it cannot be 
heteronormative no matter how prevalent. The negative view of single motherhood determines 
its heteronormativity, not the raw number of single mothers.  
Finally, given the varied treatments of heteronormativity over the years, the above 
definition and clarifications are not meant to trace the definitive boundaries of the concept. 20 
Rather, they are meant to be useful stipulations for addressing the connection between 
heteronormativity, marital norms, the law, and SSM.21 Now we can turn to the body of argument, 
beginning with the connection between SSM and norms. 
                                                 
20
 Indeed, according to Stevi Jackson (2006), there cannot be a systematic account of heteronormativity because 
“gender, sexuality and heterosexuality are approached from a variety of perspectives focusing on different 
dimensions of the social. It is not a case of some having a clearer view than others, but rather that the social is many-
faceted and what is seen from one angle may be obscured from another” (105-106). 
21
 For more on heteronormativity, see Berlant and Warner 1998, Duggan 2002, and Ryan Conrad’s edited 
collection, Against Equality (2012). Within all of these sources, one can find more specific aspects of 
heteronormativity not mentioned here, like the privileging the use of natural bodies in sex instead of manufactured 
objects (e.g. strap-on dildos, butt plugs, etc.) (Rubin 1984, 109). However, these more specific aspects are not as 
relevant to SSM and could easily be included in other aspects, like sexual conservatism. I will not be concerned to 
create a comprehensive definition of heteronormativity in this paper, and so I have omitted mentioning such specific 
aspects. 
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3 A THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF MARITAL NORMS, SOCIAL NORM 
CHANGE, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
3.1 The Connection Between Same-Sex Marriage and Norms  
As mentioned in the introduction, many view the law as having significant cultural and/or 
symbolic power over the behaviors of the populace. Those who believe in law’s effect on social 
norms expect the formal recognition of SSM to significantly change people’s behavior in and 
toward marriage. Obviously, SSM will “change” behavior by adding the behaviors of 
homosexual couples to the legal institution of marriage. But the more controversial belief is that 
more visible, formally-recognized homosexual marriages will change how people behave in 
heterosexual marriages. SSM is also purported to change people’s behavior toward marriage—
i.e. how people value marriage. Whether explicitly or implicitly, such views assume that one’s 
behavior in and toward marriage is at least partially dependent on social expectations about how 
other people act and value. And since marriage is integral to heteronormativity (A. Rich 1980, 
640-641; Elia 2003, 65; Daring et al. 2012, 12; Herz & Johansson 2015, 1011), any change of 
behavior in and toward marriage is likely to change heteronormativity. In other words, such 
views assume that important social norms connected to heteronormativity will change due to 
SSM. But do behaviors concerning marriage actually reflect social norms? Perhaps instead these 
behaviors in and toward marriage are simply self-interested and personal. People might pursue 
marriage in part for its function as a signal of trust between two parties, regardless of how 
society acts or values. Alternatively, value judgments concerning marriage may be understood 
primarily as expressions of personal normative views—moral norms that are not conditional on 
the behavior of the public or a specific social group. For the many Americans who see marriage 
as a religious institution, legal injunctions are indeed unlikely to affect their religious moral 
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injunctions, which prescribe specific behavior in and toward marriage. If behavior in and toward 
marriage does not depend on social expectations, then any concern about SSM’s effect on 
heteronormative marital norms would be unfounded. So our first task in this section must be to 
ascertain whether behavior in and toward marriage does in fact depend on the behavior of social 
groups—i.e. whether marital norms are social norms. We will first need to establish a working 
account of the relevant norms, then we can assess whether behavior in and toward marriage 
accords with this account. 
 While there are many accounts of norms and collective behavior,22 few clearly 
distinguish between habits, customs, conventions, moral norms, descriptive norms, and social 
norms. Furthermore, few accounts provide systematic steps for determining which norms are 
present in collective behavior, testing those norms, and distinguishing the various components 
that constitute them. Cristina Bicchieri’s account of norms in The Grammar of Society (2006) 
and Norms in the Wild (2016) laudably address both of these shortcomings.23 She defines each of 
the collective behaviors listed above, but collective behaviors in regard to marriage seem most 
likely to be social norms.24 A social norm is a 
rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they 
believe that (a) most people in their reference network conform to it (empirical 
expectation), and (b) that most people in their reference network believe they ought to 
conform to it (normative expectation) (Bicchieri 2016, 35).25 
 
                                                 
22 See Bicchieri & Muldoon (2011) for an overview of the literature. 
23
 Her account by no means captures every use of ‘norm,’ but we need not be concerned with all possible uses of 
these terms. Following Wittgenstein’s insight that no conceptual definition ever could capture all the family-
resemblances of a word or concept, we should be most concerned that we are using a meaningful definition that is 
most conducive to our purpose (2010 [1953]). 
24 See Bicchieri (2016, 2-3) for explanations of these other collective behaviors. 
25 Bicchieri is here using the standard philosophical meaning of normative, but see footnote 2 for an important 
distinction between this usage and its usage in ‘heteronormative.’ 
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The reference network is simply the group of people we care about or “reference” when making 
particular decisions (ibid, 14). This reference network could be as temporary and small as the 
group of people one stands in line with at the corner store (where the norms about standing in 
line might vary place by place or depending on the time of day),26 or it could be as consistent and 
large as all practicing Roman Catholics. Social norms tell us what is normal and predictable 
among our reference network in particular situations (empirical expectation) and also tell us what 
is approved and disapproved of socially (normative expectation) (ibid, 30). This approval and 
disapproval is often revealed in sanctioning, both positive and negative. We might shower gifts 
on a newly-wed couple or shame a couple that is having premarital sex. We do not only adhere 
to social norms in response to sanctions, though. We might follow social norms because we 
share the normative view of others, have our own personal normative views that are conducive to 
following the norm, or simply prefer to fit in. When visiting an Islamic country, a non-Muslim 
woman might wear a hijab because of her preference to respect and abide by local culture and its 
attendant social norms. Her reasons for adherence to the social norm differ from Muslims’ 
reasons, but her adherence is still conditional on social expectations. Other common examples of 
social norms concern corruption, trust, body modification, reciprocity, and fairness (Bicchieri 
2016). In sum, a social norm exists when our actions are influenced by whether the people in our 
social network follow a behavior and approve/disapprove of that behavior. 
 
                                                 
26 Examples of this aspect of reference networks can be found in experiments and in daily life. For example, in 
experiments reviewed by Bicchieri (2006), littering has been shown to be highly sensitive to social expectations: 
littering behavior can quickly change based on how much trash is present and/or whether the norm is made salient 
by other people’s behavior (Ch. 3). An example from daily life might concern an atheist going to a Christian friend's 
house for supper. The atheist might go along with a pre-meal prayer—because she cares about that friend and that 
friend’s family—even if she has never been among this reference network before and never will again. In these 
examples, the reference network is, or can be, temporary and small. The norm can quickly change based on which 
reference network is present, i.e. what kind of people are around (or are thought to be around). 
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3.2 Marital Social Norms in America 
Now with a working account of social norms, we can assess whether behavior in and 
toward marriage accords with this account. At first glance, it seems that the rules of behavior 
concerning marriage in the U.S. crucially depend on such social expectations. We can see this 
dependence most prominently in conservative appeals to how marriage is/has been practiced 
(empirical expectations) and appeals to how marriage should be practiced (normative 
expectations).27 Those on the left make similar appeals (e.g. Brake 2012). Thus, how others 
practice and view marriage in the relevant reference networks crucially affects how one practices 
and values marriage. Because our adherence to marital norms depend on these empirical and 
normative expectations, they can be best described as social norms. Martial norms are not just 
moral norms, which are normative despite others’ beliefs and values;28 nor are they habits or 
customs, which are merely beneficial for us, independent of how others act and value; nor are 
they descriptive norms or conventions, which depend only on empirical expectations.29  
We conform to certain marital norms because of how our reference network practices and 
views marriage. Americans care about marriage in America and care far less about “marriage” 
in, for example, the matriarchal Mosuo society in China.30 While Americans do not all share the 
                                                 
27
 Anderson (2013) establishes the empirical expectation by saying that, “virtually every human society” once 
understood marriage as “a union of a man and woman ordered to procreation and family life”— which is “the 
fundamental building block of all human civilization.” Furthermore, this institution and its accompanying norms are 
driven by more than mere self-interest: “marriage has public purposes that transcend its private purposes.” He 
establishes the normative expectations by asserting that “true marriage” requires a mother and a father and that it 
ought to be family-oriented. 
28
 Even though marital norms seem like they could qualify as moral norms due to strong religious foundations, they 
almost always function socially and are dependent on the views and practices of others. For example, Christians in 
different areas of the U.S. have different positions on whether divorce or child-bearing outside of wedlock is 
acceptable. Furthermore, over time, such norms have liberalized along with broader culture.  
29
 See Bicchieri (2016) for a comprehensive account of the distinction between habits, customs, conventions, moral 
norms, descriptive norms, and social norms (Ch. 1). 
30
 Indeed, the Mosuo people do not even practice marriage in our sense of the term. The Mosuo practice zuo hun, or 
“walking marriage,” wherein women take lovers as they please, with no strong norms of infidelity. Being a 
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same reference network or abide by the same exact social norms, their reference networks 
overlap significantly,31 such that most end up with heteronormative preferences regarding 
marriage. Traveling throughout the country, we expect others to be heteronormative and we feel 
that others expect us to be heteronormative. Oftentimes, people will sanction us for broaching 
norms, which is a clear signal that there are normative expectations at work. We might hear 
disparaging comments about single-mothers, swingers, or short-term marriages. We might even 
see community members ostracized for such non-heteronormative behaviors and situations. We 
often conform to these rules of behavior or feel their pull even when we do not personally 
believe in the value of the social norm. We conform not necessarily because we agree with the 
behaviors or views of our reference network (although we might), but because sometimes we 
simply fear being sanctioned, prefer to fit in with our community, or lack knowledge. Sometimes 
this fear of sanction and/or lack of information can lead to “pluralistic ignorance, a cognitive 
state in which each member of a group believes her personal normative beliefs and preference 
are different from those of similarly situated others, even if public behavior is identical” 
(Bicchieri 2016, 42). Pluralistic ignorance often perpetuates maladaptive norms. So social norms 
themselves are not necessarily beneficial for us individually or even for society as a whole—
even if individuals view conformity itself as beneficial (ibid, 2-3, 29). 
But even with evidence of empirical and normative expectations, we still have not 
established that people’s behavior in and toward marriage depends on these social expectations. 
Without establishing this connection, we cannot assess whether these behaviors reflect social 
                                                 
matriarchal society, the gender roles for the Mosuo are far different from western notions of marriage (Shaitly 
2010). The Mosuo have different empirical and normative expectations about “marriage” and so they follow 
different “marital” norms. 
31 As Wedgwood (1999) argues, marriage’s “social meaning consists of certain generally shared expectations” 
(229-230). 
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norms. Unfortunately, pursuing this line of argument would require surveying for conditional 
preferences, empirical expectations, and normative expectations (ibid, 50-51, 89). Such empirical 
research is costly and beyond my expertise. Luckily, though, it is unnecessary. By simply 
assuming that people follow marital social norms, we can evaluate whether SSM would have the 
potential to change marital social norms given what we know about social norm change. Hence, 
the question we will address in the remainder of this paper is this: If people follow 
heteronormative marital norms, would SSM significantly affect heteronormativity? 
 
3.3 Social Norm Change 
 Bicchieri’s account of social norms not only helps us clarify the types of norms that we 
are dealing with in marriage, it can also help us to assess how norms change in response to 
different interventions. Many actions and events can affect social norms, but since SSM is a 
government intervention, that is the type we will be concerned with here. And since SSM 
purportedly challenges heteronormativity, causing it to weaken or be abandoned, we will be 
primarily concerned with norm abandonment, not norm creation.  
From lab and field work, Bicchieri (2016) has distilled four requirements for any kind of 
norm change: “people must face a collective action problem, they must have shared reasons to 
change, their social expectations must collectively change, and their actions have to be 
coordinated” (111). For abandonment of social norms, there needs to be a change in both 
empirical and normative expectations in the relevant reference network. The order of change is 
important: 
For a social norm to emerge, normative expectations must be created first, and empirical 
expectations will follow. To abandon a social norm instead, empirical expectations will 
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have to change first, and change in normative expectations will follow (Bicchieri 2016, 
111).32 
 
So in evaluating the potential effects of SSM on the abandonment of marital norms, we will need 
to pay attention to how formal legal recognition changes empirical expectations—i.e. how 
people behave within their own marriages, how many people get married, and how people are 
generally treated in regard to their marital status. We will also need to keep in mind the relevant 
reference network, as this constrains the impact of any change in behavior. 
Given this understanding of social norms and social norm change, we might translate the 
view that SSM changes people’s behavior in and toward marriage to better assess what it claims. 
We can now more precisely say that if SSM changes people’s behaviors in and toward marriage, 
it does so by changing the empirical and normative expectations concerning marriage in most 
Americans’ reference networks. Now clear on the nature of social norms and how they change, 
we can assess whether SSM actually constitutes a significant threat to heteronormative marital 
norms. 
 
3.4 Same-Sex Marriage’s Effect on Heteronormative Marital Norms 
In this subsection, I explore two main reasons why SSM will not significantly affect 
heteronormative marital norms. First, I argue that SSM has a limited scope of influence on 
heteronormativity since it only necessarily affects two aspects—gender roles and orientation. 
Furthermore, these aspects are embedded in a resilient schema of beliefs and values; neither of 
these non-heteronormative aspects of SSM is central to heteronormative marriage, and so they 
are unlikely to upset or challenge heteronormativity. Indeed, as we will see, the importance of 
                                                 
32
 Bicchieri acknowledges that this is a simplification, as norm abandonment and emergence often occur in 
conjunction. 
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gender roles and orientation are actually downplayed while the other aspects of 
heteronormativity are embraced and strengthened. Second, even assuming their disruptive 
potential, these non-heteronormative aspects of SSM will probably not be seen or valued in most 
reference networks. Without large-scale change in empirical expectations, normative change and 
social norm abandonment are unlikely. These two reasons are independent, but not mutually 
exclusive. I discuss them in turn below. 
 
3.4.1 Limited scope of influence 
First of all, SSM only necessarily affects two aspects of heteronormative marital norms—
gender roles and sexual orientation. SSM is not really SSM without homosexual orientation and 
non-traditional gender roles.33 However, SSM does not necessarily affect the other 
heteronormative marital norms—those privileging sexual conservatism, procreation, and 
relationships that are monogamous, long-term, romantically-oriented, and (nuclear-)family-
oriented.34 Challenging these other norms is not a necessary component of SSM. 
Now while SSM does not necessarily challenge all of heteronormativity, is SSM not 
more statistically likely to include non-heteronormative norms? Indeed, there is some evidence 
that homosexual couples perform more non-heteronormative behaviors than heterosexual 
                                                 
33 A possible exception would be heterosexual friends that decide to marry for the legal benefits. However, such a 
relationship would likely be assumed to be homosexual unless otherwise clarified, so the public message would 
remain the same. Furthermore, I do not imagine such relationships being statistically significant. And if they are, this 
type of SSM could actually support my case by further separating SSM from a challenge to heteronormativity, for in 
such relationships, homosexual orientation would not be a requirement. At the same time, it would weaken the 
romantic love aspect of marriage. Much more could be said here, but for the purposes of this paper, I constrain my 
focus to SSM with homosexual partners. 
34 While homosexuals do not procreate in the traditional sense, they do commonly have children through surrogacy 
or in vitro fertilization. Heterosexual couples also take advantage of these means. I am unsure of the amount of 
stigma attached to either of these practices, but at the very least, they do not necessarily challenge or preclude 
procreation in the way that homosexuality and non-heteronormative gender roles challenge heterosexuality and 
traditional gender roles. 
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couples, like higher rates of non-monogamy and a lower desire for parenthood (Hoff et al. 2010; 
Riskind & Patterson 2010). While I do not have space here to fully engage with such 
possibilities, a few cursory points might quell such concerns and redirect focus to the non-
heteronormative aspects of SSM that are certain. First, we cannot assume that historically visible 
and publicly out homosexuals are representative of all homosexuals. It is possible—perhaps even 
likely—that as society becomes more and more accepting, many more conservative homosexuals 
will come out, which could offset the liberal behaviors of historically visible homosexuals. 
Indeed, Hoff’s study cited above only surveyed those in the very liberal San Francisco Bay Area. 
Second, some historic behaviors of homosexuals can be partially explained by legal restrictions. 
For example, legal barriers have historically prevented same-sex couples from adopting children. 
Third, not all non-heteronormative behaviors are publicly displayed. While homosexual couples 
may practice open relationships and other non-heteronormative behaviors at higher rates, the 
public could be unaware of these practices and how widespread they actually are. In short, there 
is not clear evidence that the behaviors of homosexuals actually are significantly different from 
heterosexuals. Nor is there clear evidence that current behaviors would remain representative.35 
Thus, for the present study I will primarily focus on the ineluctable aspects of SSM: homosexual 
orientation and non-heteronormative gender roles. 
Changing just two aspects of legal marriage through SSM is unlikely to significantly 
change heteronormative marital norms because the beliefs and values concerning marriage are 
not independent. Rather, they are embedded in an interdependent schema of beliefs and values 
that reinforce one another, increasing resistance to fundamental change. Importantly, even when 
specific beliefs and values are changed within a schema, the central beliefs and values in that 
                                                 
35 For more on the difficulty of establishing representative samples of the LGBT population, see Shankle et al. 
2003; Gates 2011; Institute of Medicine 2011; and Coffman et al. 2016. 
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schema may not change at all. This process can result in an update of the schema, instead of 
abandonment (Bicchieri 2016, 140). Societies can adapt repressive schemata; they need not 
abandon them. In such a case, the overall system of norms remains intact. There is no significant 
change. For example, in the Nsenene village of Tanzania, more progressive notions of women’s 
ability to engage in market production and be a family provider were simply added to the 
existing, repressive schema for gender roles and marital roles (ibid; see also Boudet et al. 2012). 
That is, women were still expected to do the domestic duties like cleaning, cooking, and taking 
care of the children, even as the specific social norm restricting their ability to work was 
weakened (Bicchieri 2016, 140). The schema was updated, but remained fundamentally 
repressive and restrictive for women. In the same way, then, we might simply expect 
homosexual identity or non-heteronormative gender roles, such as men performing all the 
domestic duties, to be added to an updated notion of heteronormative marriage and its supporting 
social norms, beliefs, and values. Simply updating two aspects of the heteronormative marital 
schema would not fundamentally change that schema, it would still restrict those identities and 
expressions that mainstream culture rejects. Without addressing the schema as a whole or its 
central beliefs and values, SSM is unlikely to change much concerning mainstream marital 
norms.36 Indeed, as Cristina Bicchieri and Peter McNally (2018) argue in a forthcoming paper, 
“ignoring the cognitive underpinnings of a social norm doom[s] interventions to failure” (1).  
Furthermore, homosexual identity and non-heteronormative gender roles are not even 
meant to challenge mainstream marital norms or heteronormativity. Instead, advocates of SSM 
aim to uphold and bolster the existing schema for marriage. SSM simply amends the requirement 
                                                 
36 Perhaps, SSM can be a small step toward significantly challenging heteronormative marital norms, but this step 
by itself guarantees neither further development nor a significant challenge. And regardless, the historical trends in 
acceptance of SSM recounted in section four will further undermine the potential causal efficacy of this small step. 
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for heterosexuality and gendered division of labor based on traditional gender roles. Moreover, 
the importance of these aspects is downplayed—it is not gender or orientation that is important 
in marriage, it is love, commitment, emotional fulfillment, long-term partnerships, romance, 
sexual exclusivity, sexual conservatism, self-actualization, and family.37 Politicians, pundits, 
activists, and casual supporters alike argue that SSM embodies these important aspects of 
marriage just as well as heterosexual marriage. In doing so, they attempt to assimilate SSM into 
mainstream culture: it is “virtually normal” (Sullivan 1995; see also Warner 1999) and a 
“civilized commitment” (Eskridge 1996). Supporters of SSM thus utilize “homonormativity: a 
politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions—such as 
marriage, and its call for monogamy and reproduction—but upholds and sustains them” (Duggan 
2002, 179).38 Activists utilize images of the family, focus on how gay couples contribute to 
society, and contest the stereotype that homosexuals are promiscuous (Huntington 2015, 25). 
These narratives largely reinforce, rather than challenge, the marital schema, marital norms, and 
heteronormativity (Elia 2003, 78). In other words, supporters of SSM largely work against the 
disruption of heteronormative marital norms. 
 
3.4.2 The importance of reference networks 
Whether or not the above points hold, considering the relevant reference network 
presents an additional barrier to challenging heteronormativity. According to the account of 
social norm change presented above in subsection 3.3, it seems plausible that SSM could cause 
                                                 
37 Emotional fulfillment and self-actualization are specific, contemporary aspects of marriage that mainstream 
Western culture has gradually come to expect, accept, and privilege (Cherlin 2004; Coontz 2006; and Horowitz 
2015). This point will be explored in greater depth in section four. 
38
 Following from our definition of heteronormativity at the beginning of this paper, we might also understand 
homonormativity as the privileging of LGBTQ+ identities and issues that are heteronormative. 
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significant change in marital norms: SSM would associate non-heteronormative gender roles and 
same-sex attraction with the culturally symbolic label of marriage, thereby changing the 
empirical expectations for what marriage is. As we saw, changes in empirical expectations can 
then lead to changes in normative expectations and eventual social norm abandonment. However, 
this empirical change would not be sufficient to change the social norm, for it is not just 
empirical expectations per se but those within the relevant reference network that affect 
adherence to the social norm. So if same-sex couples and their supporters are not within one’s 
reference network, we should not expect this empirical change to have any strong effect on one’s 
adherence to heteronormativity. Even assuming same-sex couples are a part of most people’s 
reference networks, social norms are not likely to change, for widespread non-compliance with a 
norm is necessary to encourage non-compliance in others (Bicchieri & Mercier 2014). Since 
openly homosexual couples are such a small minority among US couples,39 we should not expect 
many people’s empirical expectations about adherence to marital norms to change (especially if 
most homosexuals are in fact assimilated).40 Without a large-scale change in empirical 
                                                 
39 According to a 2011 U.S. Census Bureau, “nationally, about 1 percent of all couple households were same-sex 
couples” (Lofquist 2011, 1). One can also look to statistics on homosexual identification in order to see the potential 
for an increase of this rate. While statistics vary and homosexual identification is rising, homosexual identification 
does not range above 5%. For example, according to a 2011 report by the Williams Institute, 3.5% of American 
adults identified as homosexual or bisexual (Gates 2011). According to a 2013 survey conducted by the Center for 
Disease Control, only 2.3% of Americans self-identified as homosexual or bisexual (B. Ward et al. 2014, 1). Gallup 
reported LGBT identification at 4.1% in 2016, but did not separate lesbian, gay, and bisexual identification from 
transgender identification (Gates 2017). 
40 Now perhaps the media or informational cascades could enhance the impact of a change even among a small 
minority group. For example, if married homosexuals were overrepresented in television shows, then at least most 
people would be exposed to a different empirical situation. However, no change in empirical expectations would 
necessarily result—and regardless, this situation seems highly unlikely given the current amount and type of media 
representation of homosexuals. Informational cascades seem slightly more promising, as they rely on the gradual 
diffusion of a norm through a social network and do not require a large group of defectors (Bicchieri 2006, 176, 
196). However, informational cascades are best applied to situations of pluralistic ignorance (Bicchieri & Fukui 
1999, 104). SSM does not seem to be a case of pluralistic ignorance, as many aspects of heteronormative marriage 
are explicitly endorsed by the public. Finally, at most we could only expect the informational cascade to work 
among liberals, as there is limited transmission of politically-charged norms across the right-left political divide. 
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expectations, it is highly unlikely that we would see a change in normative expectations 
(Bicchieri 2016, 120).41 Hence, we should not expect heteronormative marital norms to be 
significantly changed by SSM.42  
In sum, homosexuals do not make up a significant portion of the relevant reference 
networks for mainstream, heteronormative marital norms; SSM challenges only two aspects of 
marital norms without directly addressing the central beliefs and values in the heteronormative 
schema; and these two aspects are downplayed in order to assimilate SSM into mainstream, 
heteronormative marriage. While it is possible for SSM to affect social norms, there are many 
factors working against this potential influence. Section four will further challenge the potential 
for SSM to affect heteronormativity by considering the historical relation between the law, social 
norms, and marriage. 
 
4 A HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE LAW, 
SOCIAL NORMS, AND MARRIAGE 
 The account of social norms above argues against the ability of state-recognized SSM to 
significantly change heteronormative marital norms. However, this account might seem 
counterintuitive to most: at first glance, the state seems like a primary site for cultural change. 
We have significant examples of the state repealing socially harmful laws (e.g. sodomy, 
segregation, and public decency), conferring rights to marginalized groups (e.g. the 19th 
                                                 
41 Simply proclaiming a behavior right or wrong carries much less weight when societal behavior does not change 
accordingly. 
42
 Perhaps people view SSM as crucially affecting future generations. While this line of objection proves stronger 
than the claim that SSM will significantly change social norms now, section four will counter this objection by 
arguing that the law is best seen as an indicator of underlying changes in material conditions and culture. Thus, this 
objection may be incorrectly identifying the significant causal factors which influence future generations. 
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Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1964), and even providing positive support for marginalized 
groups (e.g. affirmative action). These actions were in part successful because of the nature of 
state enforcement and legislation, for “it can inflict sanctions without risk of disavowal and can 
disavow sanctions by others” (De Jasay 1985, 19). That is, the state could uniformly apply 
protections and benefits, even in places that had strong opposition to these interventions. 
Following the specific interventions mentioned above, views of the relevant marginalized groups 
became more favorable and mainstream norms negatively affecting them were eliminated or 
changed into less harmful ones. Could not the same process occur with SSM? Perhaps the above 
argument is correct that SSM alone does not change social norms, but is it not a significant part 
of the process of changing social norms? Is the above argument simply missing the broader 
picture? At this point we have to be careful not to confuse correlation for causation. We also 
need to consider the direction of causality and possible common causes. In the cases just cited, 
norms and cultural views might have just as well been shifting before or alongside changing 
legal views and policies. These interventions were only legal protections and benefits—they did 
not guarantee change in beliefs, values, or norms. Thus, we will need to examine further the 
relationship between culture, norms, and the government in order to determine the nature of the 
causal connection between SSM and heteronormativity. Taking a broad, historical view of this 
relationship is instructive and will ultimately dispel the claim that SSM causes a significant 
change in heteronormative marital norms.  
 
4.1 Investigating a Common Cause for Change in Social Norms and the Law 
If SSM can be best explained as an outgrowth of long-term historical trends, it will be 
that much more unlikely that SSM by itself is challenging heteronormative marital norms. In 
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fact, several scholars have given largely consistent accounts of such long-term historical trends. 
Historians such as Andrew Cherlin (2004; 2010), John D’Emilio (1983; 2006), Estelle B. 
Freedman (D’Emilio & Freedman 1998), and Stephanie Coontz (2005), as well as economists 
such as Jeremy Greenwood and Nezih Guner (2008) and Steven Horwitz (2015), note economic 
conditions and cultural shifts as the driving force of change in marital norms and family 
structure. With the Industrial Revolution and move to wage labor in the U.S. came significant 
changes in family structure due to increases in material wealth: the family unit became less of an 
economic necessity; women gained economic, cultural, and political autonomy; and non-
heteronormative sexual identities emerged and formed their own communities (D’Emilio 1983; 
Cherlin 2004, 851; Coontz 2006; Greenwood & Guner 2008; Horwitz 2015). Throughout the 20th 
century, traditional norms surrounding marriage gradually weakened as divorce rates increased, 
sexual mores loosened, women gradually increased their workforce participation, and children 
figured less centrally in long-term romantic relationships (Cherlin 2004, 851; D’Emilio 2006, 11; 
Greenwood & Guner 2008).  
Thus, for the last 200 years or so, marriage has not retained a consistent function, form, 
value, or set of norms (Coontz 2006, Introduction; Horwitz 2015, Ch. 1). As the function and 
form of marriage have changed, so has adherence to all aspects of heteronormative marital 
norms—notably, what marriage is and should be, the importance of children, gender roles, 
sexual conservatism, and heterosexuality. By examining how and why these aspects of 
heteronormativity have changed historically we will provide a strong account of a common cause 
for both change in social norms and the law. With this account, SSM will appear to be a logical 
step in the evolution of marriage, rather than a disruptive departure. 
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4.1.1 What is marriage and what should it be? 
For most of human history, marriage has primarily served economic and political needs. 
Marriage was necessary for its members’ success in agriculture and business, but perhaps even 
more important was marriage’s essential role in fulfilling the needs of the community, as it 
converted strangers into relatives and increased cooperation among distant groups (Coontz 2006, 
6-7; Brake 2012, 10; Horwitz 2015, 73). Without the material wealth and freedoms of modern, 
industrialized society, communities faced severe costs if its members avoided marriage or sought 
to disrupt its functions. Communities had certain empirical and social expectations about how 
marriage should function—i.e. social norms. For example, they “monitor[ed] couples for 
adultery or for either one abandoning their responsibilities in the household and/or farm” 
(Horwitz 2015, 73). Marriage had one function and one form. A strict set of norms guaranteed 
the continuation of both. Since then, the function of marriage has become much more 
individualized, marital forms have proliferated, and marital norms have weakened or, in some 
cases, utterly transformed (Cherlin 2004, 848; Horwitz 2015, 166, 168). Increases in material 
wealth are central to these changes, for without expansion of the economy, labor-saving 
technology would not develop quickly, women would not have leverage for political gains, and 
child-laborers and family would remain economically necessary for survival, as explained below. 
As increases in material wealth enabled more choice and bargaining power, “free choice became 
the societal norm for mate selection, love became the main reason for marriage, and a successful 
marriage came to be defined as one that met the needs of its members” (Coontz 2006, 306-307). 
What was once a matter of economic and political necessity is now often a matter of 
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preference—notably, procreation and raising children, traditional gender roles, and sexual 
conservatism.43 It is to these three aspects that we now turn. 
  
4.1.2 Children and procreation 
Children and procreation have always factored importantly in marriage. Children were 
originally necessary for agricultural labor and household production. Most, if not all, households 
would burden themselves economically and politically if they forwent children.44 Additionally, 
in poor communities where the survival of all depended on the conformity of its members, 
childless marriages and single people would encounter severe, negative social sanctions (Horwitz 
2015, 74). Child labor remained useful at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, but as the 
economy expanded and wages rose, children became costlier to families.  
The higher the material wealth of a society, the more that parents will need to invest in 
their children in order to make them competitive in the market. The more the parents invest, the 
less resources they are left with. So in wealthy societies, economic constraints typically dictate 
the maximum as opposed to minimum amount of children. Such societies, then, face the opposite 
constraints of agricultural societies. Furthermore, because of the increasing focus on the 
happiness of the individuals in the marriage as opposed to their community contribution, some 
marriages even became childless, especially as women increasingly committed themselves to 
careers (Horwitz 2015, 125). Children still feature centrally in the family, but the birth rate has 
gradually declined across the last 200 years (D’Emilio & Freedman 1998, vi). Additionally, 
                                                 
43 I acknowledge that these are not matters of pure, free choice devoid of institutional and cultural pressures. The 
main point here is to acknowledge the breakdown of a singular form and function of marriage.  
44 The burden for poorer households was mostly economic, as there was a significant loss in potential agricultural 
and household labor. The burden for richer households was mostly political, as marrying off children was one of the 
chief means for expanding and retaining a family’s political power.  
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“marriage is no longer the nearly universal setting for childbearing,” as more and more births 
occur outside of marriage (Cherlin 2004, 849). Thus, the procreative and family-centered aspects 
of heteronormativity have been on the decline for some time. 
  
4.1.3 Gender roles 
Since procreation and childcare have historically been integral to women’s role in the 
family, the above trends in childbearing also contribute to the weakening of restrictive gender 
roles. Without lots of children, demand for women’s household production decreases, and they 
experience less interruptions to market production. They do not need to birth, feed, clothe, clean, 
and shop for numerous children. Instead, they can invest in their own human capital with 
education and job training, pursue a career, or focus on creative work and self-actualization—
activities historically reserved for men.45 
While certain periods over the last 200 years actually increased the gendered division of 
labor (e.g. the doctrine of the “separate spheres” in the 1800’s [Horwitz 2015, 90] and the 
nuclear family of the 1950’s [Cherlin 2004, 851]), in general, marital gender roles have become 
less distinguishable and less important. Technological advances, like the washing machine, 
dishwasher, sewing machine, and microwave, have significantly lowered the time required for 
household production (Shelton & John 1996, 302-303; Greenwood & Guner 2008). Additionally, 
increases in wages made these technologies available to an increasing number of people 
(Horwitz 2015, 116). Together, increases in wages and technological advances increased 
women’s ability to pursue a career and other self-actualizing activities. 
                                                 
45 While industrialized societies do require more investment in individual children, most of the increased investment 
is typically in education and extracurricular activities. Since this type of investment is largely monetary, it does not 
constrain women to the household as much and the burden can be more easily shared among parents. 
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Along with economic advances have come a host of political advances that have removed 
restrictions on women’s access to economic, political, and social institutions (e.g. the 19th 
amendment, elimination of coverture, and equal opportunity in employment). Similarly, social 
movements and cultural revolutions have eliminated harmful social norms and empowered 
women to self-actualize in ways that had not been allowed or possible. These advances have 
significantly diminished the importance of gender roles, such that “married couples may no 
longer have a clear set of rules about which partner should do what in their marriage…[although] 
they do have a clear set of rules about what each partner should not do” (Coontz 2006, 309).  
This “clear set of rules” protects the self-actualizing aspects of marriage by barring the 
imposition of regressive gender roles and one-sided decision-making (ibid, 311). 
Important effects of these political and economic advances for women can be seen in 
time-use surveys. Various analyses of time use surveys show that women’s household labor has 
significantly declined and women’s market production has increased, while men’s household 
labor has increased and men’s market production has decreased (Gershuny & Robinson 1988; 
Bianchi et al. 2000; Archer et al. 2013; Bianchi et al. 2012; Parker & Wang 2013; but see 
Shelton & John 1996 for methodological considerations). With the weakening of restrictive 
gender roles and marital division of labor, heteronormativity has likewise diminished. That 
homosexual couples do not have as clearly defined marital roles seems quite consistent with 
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trends for the contemporary family, which increasingly feature non-heteronormative gender 
roles, like female breadwinners,46 and more equal division of household chores.47 
 
4.1.4 Sexual conservatism  
Just like changes in childbearing and gender roles, changes in sexuality are enabled by 
economic change (D’Emilio & Freedman 1998, xiv; see also Cherlin 2004, 851). Expansion of 
the economy—and its attendant increases in opportunities and wealth—enabled men and women 
to be more selective in their partners, both sexual and marital. As their economic and social 
dependence on marriage and the family weakened, they were free to have sex outside of 
marriage and make sexual compatibility a higher priority in marriage. 
 Increases in material wealth also increased choices through various advances in 
medicine, technology, sex education, public discourse, cultural movements, and 
commercialization (Horwitz 2015, 110; D’Emilio & Freedman 1998). One of the most important 
advances was the birth control pill, introduced in 1960, which “enabled women, really for the 
first time, to be in total control of their fertility[;]…as the Pill separated sex from pregnancy, it 
also [further] separated sex from marriage” (Horwitz 2015, 123). Men and especially women had 
                                                 
46 According to Sarah Jane Glynn (2016) at the Center for American Progress, “in 2015—the year for which the 
most recent data are available—42 percent of mothers were sole or primary breadwinners, bringing in at least half of 
family earnings. Nearly another one-quarter of mothers—22.4 percent—were co-breadwinners, bringing home from 
25 percent to 49 percent of earnings for their families. This represents an increase over previous years and is the 
continuation of a long-running trend, as women’s earnings and economic contributions to their families continue to 
grow in importance.” 
47 Since the 1960’s, the “roles of moms and dads [have] converge[d] as they balance work and family,” according to 
a 2013 Pew Research Center analysis (Parker & Wang 2013, Ch. 1). Although, “data from the General Social 
Survey (GSS) reveals that…convergence in gender roles among married couples seems to have slowed over the past 
20 years” (Austin Institute 2014). Furthermore, “time in work and leisure is somewhat unbalanced among single-
income families, especially when the mother is the breadwinner” (Parker & Wang 2013, Ch. 4). There is certainly 
room for improvement, but the important point here is that the trend has been in the direction of less division of 
labor. Thus, the non-heteronormative division of labor in homosexual couplings is not a significant outlier compared 
to the existing division of labor in heterosexual couplings. See also Coontz 2006, 299. 
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the autonomy to have sex when they wanted, without needing to worry about pregnancy. The pill 
then facilitated the sexual revolution of the 1960’s, which pushed for change in social norms and 
the removal of legal restrictions on sexual autonomy.  
All these changes go to show that “the dominant meaning of sexuality changed over the 
course of U.S. history from a primary association with reproduction within families to a primary 
association with emotional intimacy and individual physical pleasure” (D’Emilio & Freedman 
1998, v). Sexuality, then, followed a progression similar to marriage—from economic and 
political necessity to psychological fulfillment and individual choice. As men and especially 
women have gained more economic and political power, the sexual conservatism and exclusivity 
of heteronormativity have continually decreased. 
 
4.1.5 Same-Sex marriage as evolution, not revolution 
The shift in the meaning of and reasons for marriage highlighted above also facilitated 
gays and lesbians viewing their attraction as essential parts of their identity (Horwitz 2015, 
128).48 Indeed, many of the above changes lead logically to acceptance, or at least toleration, of 
SSM: 
With the collapse of…[the assumption that marriage is tied to procreation] in the 
twentieth century, the legalization of the close analogy of interracial marriage, and the 
more general multiplication of new family forms, the gay and lesbian demand to be 
included in the world of marriage and family is hardly as revolutionary as it first seemed 
(Horwitz 2015, 126). 
 
The demand for gay and lesbian marriage was an inevitable result of the previous 
revolution in heterosexual marriage. It was heterosexuals who had already created many 
                                                 
48 Further evidence of the importance of these historical events for homosexual identity is John D’Emilio’s (1983) 
highly influential article, “Capitalism and Gay Identity.” D’Emilio here argues that gay identity itself is an 
outcropping of increases of material wealth (see also Horwitz 2015, 126). His argument follows the same line as 
above: as material wealth increases, the family becomes less of an economic necessity, newfound independence then 
allows men to eschew marriage, form their own communities, and fully express and identify with their homosexual 
desires (D’Emilio 1983, 104). Like marriage, then, gay identity results from increases in material wealth. 
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alternative structures for organizing sexual relationships or raising children and broken 
down the primacy of two-parent families based on a strict division of labor between men 
and women (Coontz 2006, 274; See also Coontz 2011). 
 
Of course, some communities still follow social norms dictating that SSM should not be 
recognized and that homosexuals should not be in family relations at all. However, what the 
above changes show is that there exists a strong and consistent basis for extending marital norms 
and legal marriage to include homosexuals (e.g. Wellington 1995; Wedgwood 1999). If marriage 
is now primarily about free choice, individuality, the expression of love, companionship, and 
fulfilling the needs of the individuals involved, there seems to be little reason for barring 
homosexuals from such a union. Clearly, homosexuals are capable of fulfilling the main 
functions of contemporary marriage. The homosexual form of marriage does not disrupt 
marriage’s functions or radically depart from its other forms. 
While it’s tempting to point to SSM as a primary causal factor changing the norms, 
function, and form of marriage, these changes also align with longstanding historical trends 
moving from a single, necessary form of marriage to liberalization, free choice, and a plurality of 
forms. Love and companionship have increasingly become the primary reasons for marriage. 
Extending legal marriage to gays and lesbians represents a logical step in the gradual evolution 
of the institution of marriage rather than a disruptive departure. Without a correlation between 
SSM and a sharp increase in the rate of change in marital structure, norms, or public opinion, it is 
difficult to argue that SSM is a driver of change in marital norms or a significant challenge to 
heteronormativity. While these conclusions do not preclude SSM from having some causal force 
in changing norms, the restrictions on the law explored in the next subsection will further limit 
its potential effects. 
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4.2 Reverse Causation and Constraints on the Law’s Effectiveness 
4.2.1 Law as a lagging indicator of social norms 
The history of marriage recounted above suggest that changes in heteronormative marital 
norms can be best described as the effects of changes in the economy and culture rather than 
changes in the law. While there have been important changes in the law, these changes stem 
from the more fundamental changes in material wealth and culture. And just because we might 
see the trends now does not mean we can intelligently intervene in the future: as Horwitz 
cautions, “unpredictable change produced by market economies will often lead to changes in the 
culture that are equally difficult to predict and nearly impossible to control” (2015, 52). Indeed, 
the history of the law, heteronormativity, and marriage seem to suggest that mainstream values 
and norms form and constrain the law, not the other way around. This suggestion matches the 
historical trends recounted above and could explain why SSM is assimilationist and 
homonormative—as opposed to radical or progressive.49 Indeed, it explains why most policy 
inclusive of LGBTQ+ identities tends to be assimilationist and homonormative. If mainstream 
culture is heteronormative, it should not be surprising that viable policy proposals, regulations, 
and court decisions will be hetero- or homonormative. The law in the U.S. is largely the product 
of majoritarian, representative democracy. Since it takes time for politicians to be elected, judges 
to be replaced, and policy to be implemented, much of the law is likely to be a lagging indicator 
of mainstream values, beliefs, and norms. One indication of this relation in regard to SSM is the 
difference in time between public support for legal recognition of same-sex marriage and actual 
legal recognition of same-sex marriage. Indeed, as early as 2010, a majority of Americans 
approved of SSM (Baunach 2012, 368). However, it was not until 2015 that the Supreme Court 
                                                 
49 Homonormativity is the privileging of LGBTQ+ identities and issues that are heteronormative. See page 21 of 
this thesis. 
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ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that state-level bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. 
The historian John D’Emilio (2006) notes a similar pattern for desegregation and abortion: 
[The] Supreme Court…has not generally led in struggles for social justice. Rather, it has 
tended to intervene as a new social consensus develops. Decisions like Brown v. Board of 
Education and Roe v. Wade do not prove that social movements should turn to the courts 
to deliver justice. Instead they show that litigation produces the desired results only after 
a lot of groundwork outside the courts has been laid (10).50 
 
While the courts do not exactly proactively “intervene” in social justice issues, there are a 
number of factors that constrain which cases come to be selected for review and how they are 
decided. First of all, prosecutors must feel that the case is strong. Secondly, the court needs 
compelling reason to hear the case: the case needs to be important culturally, speak to judicial 
interest, or involve conflict among conflicting government bodies. Since only 2% of petitioned 
cases are heard by the Supreme Court each year, contentious cases such as those mentioned 
above must meet a very high bar in order to have widespread impact. Finally, judges must find 
the case convincing. Since judges are either elected themselves or appointed by elected officials, 
they are unlikely to hold radical views on the nature of law.51 They are much more likely to 
simply reflect the dominant view and values of their party, that is, a mainstream approach. Thus, 
what is convincing to the judge will likely be convincing or at least understandable to many 
Americans, especially moderates. As for the legislative branch, the periodic nature of elections, 
the lack of accountability for sitting politicians, and the large number of non-voters among the 
                                                 
50 Both Brown v. Board and Roe v. Wade had substantial majority support from the U.S. populace at the time of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions (Carrol 2004; Krane 2007). For a more extensive account of the court’s relation to public 
opinion generally see Rosenberg 2008. For an account that focuses on the court’s relation to SSM, see Klarman 
2012. 
51
 There are approximately 30,000 state judges, compared to only 1,700 federal judges (IAALS 2017, 3). All federal 
judges are presidentially nominated and confirmed by the Senate. Nineteen of the fifty states in the U.S. (38%) have 
appointive systems for appellate and general jurisdiction courts; twenty-two (44%) have elective systems; and the 
remaining nine (18%) have mixed appointive-elective systems (“Judicial Selection in the States” 2013, 2).  
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young who tend to be more liberal52 all contribute to the law being a conservative institution that 
lags behind more liberal public opinion. It seems that both judicially and legislatively, the law is 
generally a lagging indicator of public opinion.53   
 
4.2.2 Backlash 
 Finally, even if SSM turns out in practice to be more disruptive and radical than would 
be expected given the above historical trends, the law will not remain effective. Law that 
supports unpopular social norms faces problems of implementation, enforcement, and long-term 
viability. Indeed, Bicchieri (2016) finds that “perhaps the most important determinant of 
successful enforcement is a sense that the legal arrangements are not so distant from existing 
social norms as to lose credibility” (145; see also Bicchieri & Mercier 2014, 65). Bicchieri and 
Mercier (2014) reference several works to back up this claim: Platteau (2000) provides a book-
length treatment of the importance of considering various indigenous norms in African economic 
development, such as land tenure rights, norms of income-sharing, and moral norms; Aldashev et 
al. (2010a, b) provide empirical examples concerning the difficulty of crafting effective state 
legislation for heterogeneous populations.54 Such research reflects the growing awareness of the 
importance of indigenous actors and informal institutions within economics—e.g. in new 
                                                 
52
 For example, see Tilley & Evans 2014. 
53 This insight applies best to policy that is highly publicized, controversial, and/or conflicts with the beliefs and 
values of many people—e.g. SSM. The extent to which this insight applies to esoteric policy, say, small changes in 
regulation of endangered species, is questionable and requires a separate research project. 
54 In reviewing situations of legal pluralism—i.e. “the coexistence of several law systems”—Aldashev et al. (2010a) 
report that “except in cases where the statutory law is grounded in customary rules, legal pluralism tends to produce 
neutral or negative effects” (2, 3). While Aldashev et al. go on to offer possible conditions under which law can 
affect social norms, several conditions must obtain, and even then, a law only “might create a situation in which its 
objectives are partly met” (ibid, 27, my emphasis). 
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institutional economics,55 developmental economics,56 and comparative institutional analysis57 
(Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson 2008).  
In regards to SSM, the history of state-based amendments regarding SSM reveals the 
backlash that occurs when the law diverges sharply from common norms and values. In the 
1970’s and 80’s, homosexuals rose to prominence in the public eye and started publicly 
contesting the constitutionality of marriage restrictions. However, at this time, the public still 
generally disapproved of homosexual activity, let alone marriage. As a result, “judges decisively 
rejected the legal arguments for gay marriage,” states began enacting new statutes to explicitly 
restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples, and gay-rights activists faced severe social 
repercussions (Klarman 2012, 18-19). It was not until the 90’s that Hawai‘i became the first state 
to consider the denial of same-sex marriage licenses as unconstitutional in Baehr v. Miike. In 
reaction to this consideration, the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was passed in 1996 
and Hawai‘ian voters passed legislation and a constitutional amendment to restrict marriage to 
opposite-sex couples, forcing the dismissal of Baehr v. Miike in 1999. Similar backlash occurred 
in Massachusetts in 2004, California in 2008, Maine in 2009, and various states, counties, and 
cities throughout this time.58 Summing up some of these trends in 2006, D’Emilio noted that “the 
battle to win same-sex marriage through the courts has done something that no other campaign 
or issue in our movement has done: it has created a vast body of new antigay law” (10, my 
emphasis). So straying too far from marital norms can cause backlash which, for at least a time, 
entrenches dominant norms instead of changing them.  
                                                 
55 See, for example, the work of Elinor Ostrom (e.g. Governing the Commons [1990]). 
56 See, for example, Hayami (1997, 280-282). 
57 See, for example, Aoki (2001). 
58 See Klarman (2012) for a book-length examination of such backlash in response to SSM. 
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Dan Kahan (2000) has commented on this pattern of backlash and entrenchment in regard 
to legal norms generally:  
If a new legal norm imposes harsh penalties against an accepted social norm, police will 
be less likely to enforce the legal norm, prosecutors will be less likely to charge, and 
juries to convict, with the effect of ultimately reinforcing the social norm that was 
intended to be changed (146, my emphasis). 
 
Because of these hurdles, Kahan recommends “gentle nudges” over “hard shoves” in the law. Of 
course, law is meant to be uniformly applied, so we face issues even with gentle nudges. In order 
for the norm to be effective in all places, the law will need to accommodate the lowest common 
denominator. In the case of SSM, then, laws will need to be somewhat accommodating of the 
norms of conservative communities if lawmakers want them to be applied consistently, 
effectively, and as intended. With such a small potential for change in social norms, it seems 
unlikely that the law is sufficient to quickly and significantly expand protections of LGBTQ+ 
identities or change the social norms that harm them. With the evidence of the problems of 
implementation, enforcement, and resilience in the social sciences and SSM-relevant legal 
policy, we can reasonably conclude that mainstream norms modulate the effectiveness of 
legislation. By and large, social norms constrain legislation, not the reverse. 
 The appeal to effective legislation, like women’s rights and civil rights, at the beginning 
of section four usefully led us to re-evaluate the historical relationship between the law and 
heteronormative marital norms. By considering possible common causes and the direction of 
causation, we significantly weakened the claim that SSM causes significant change in 
heteronormative marital norms. Furthermore, given the evidence, we should not only be 
skeptical of the law’s ability to change marital norms and challenge heteronormativity, we 
should seriously consider the evidence showing that the opposite is true: long-term change in 
marital and cultural norms has resulted in the formal recognition of SSM. And if mainstream 
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norms do not actually support SSM, we should expect to encounter problems of implementation, 
enforcement, and long-term viability. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 Considering how social norms change theoretically and historically casts doubt on the 
claim that the law is—or could be—a reliable, significant, and effective driver of change in 
heteronormative marital norms. Same-sex marriage does not actually change much in 
mainstream marital norms. The only challenge seems to come from its non-heteronormative 
gender roles and homosexuality, but the importance of these aspects is downplayed (not to 
mention the fact that they have been increasingly accepted in contemporary society). Even 
assuming an empirical change in what marriage looks like, the effect will be minimal because 
homosexuals are not a part of the reference network for most people, especially for the 
conservative right, the contingent most concerned with the erosion and abandonment of 
traditional marital norms. Examining the history of the law’s relation to SSM further undermines 
the law’s potential to significantly change social norms, as the law has not significantly or 
successfully contested mainstream culture for long periods of time. Finally, even if in practice 
SSM comes to diverge sharply from mainstream marital norms, the law has self-corrective 
measures that will respond to such deviance. Thus, because of the theoretical and historical 
limitations on the law’s effect on social norms, anyone focusing their attention on SSM as a 
means for saving or eliminating heteronormativity has been wasting their time.  
The significant trends and changes in adherence to heteronormativity, marital norms, and other 
social norms exist prior to their legal manifestation. So those concerned with changing social 
norms should look to non-state factors, such as increases in material wealth, as highlighted 
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above, media representations (Gross 2012 [2001]), or significant cultural events like Pride 
parades (Bruce 2016). Since the conditions for social norm change and the limits on 
governmental intervention are grounded in wide-ranging empirical and theoretical evidence, 
these insights can apply more generally (Bicchieri 2016). Thus, this thesis has important 
implications for how we should engage with future changes in the law. At the very least, we 
should consider viewing the law as an indication of cultural shifts and thereby reorient our focus 
to non-state factors. For effective and significant social change, we cannot rely primarily on the 
law. 
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